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Abstract  
This study examines complementarities between inclusive development, military expenditure 
and political stability in the fight against terrorism in 53 African countries for the period 
1998-2012. Hence the policy variables employed in the study are inclusive development, 
military expenditure and political stability. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations. The paper reports three 
main findings. Firstly, military expenditure and inclusive development are substitutes and not 
complements. Secondly, it is more relevant to use political stability as a complement of 
inclusive development than to use inclusive development as a complement of political 
stability. Thirdly, it can be broadly established that military expenditure and political stability 
are complementary. In the light of the sequencing, complementarity and substitutability, when 
the three policy variables are viewed within the same framework, it is more feasible to first 
pursue political stability and then complement it with military expenditure and inclusive 
development. 
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1. Introduction 
  A number of reasons motivate this study on complementarities between inclusive 
development, military expenditure and political stability in the fight against terrorism in 
Africa, namely: growing levels of terrorism in Africa; the  tragedy of poverty  in the 
continent; debates revolving around the impact of military expenditure on terrorism; 
controversies on the relationship between terrorism and political governance; debates 
surrounding the effect of ‘poverty and human development’ on terrorism and shortcomings in 
the literature. The motivating factors are discussed in detail below. 
Terrorism has been increasing in Africa due to ethnic and tribal tensions, state failures, 
endemic corruption and religious fundamentalism (Fazel, 2013; Alfa-Wali et al., 2015; 
Asongu et al., 2017). When compared to the Middle East, the continent is not receiving the 
scholarly attention it deserves (Clavarino, 2014).  Some of the notable examples of terrorist 
organisations that have been affecting livelihoods on the continent include: al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabab in Somalia and the Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to  a 
recent publication by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2015), in 2014 the Boko Haram of 
Nigeria was the deadliest terrorist movement causing  6,644 deaths compared to the  Islamic 
State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) which caused 6,073 deaths. Such conflicts have contributed 
substantially to slowing the path to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
(Stewart, 2003).  
 According to a World Bank (2015) report on achievement of MDGs’ extreme poverty 
reduction targets, extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the 
exception of Africa where about 45% of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are considerably 
off-track from the MDGs extreme poverty reduction target (Tchamyou, 2019, 2020). This 
poverty co-exists with  more than twenty years of growth resurgence in the continent that 
commenced in the mid 1990s (see Fosu, 2015a, p. 44) and questions the  overly optimistic 
narrative of ‘Africa rising’ (Leautier, 2012; Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014).  
This inquiry interrogates whether inclusive development mitigates terrorism by examining 
whether non-inclusive development experienced by the sampled countries over the past 
decade is a fundamental cause of terrorism2. This position complements a recent stream of 
                                                          
2
 In accordance with Asongu et al. (2015), inclusive development is measured with the inequality adjusted 
human development index (IHDI). The IHDI is the national average of achievements in three main domains, 
namely: (i) decent standards of living; (ii) health and long life and (iii) knowledge. Apart from accounting for 
average gains in health, education and wealth, the IHDI also accounts for the distribution of the achievements 
among the population by controlling for mean values of each domain with respect to inequality. 
4 
 
literature that is questioning World Bank claims about Africa’s growth resurgence by 
focussing on the non-inclusive character of Africa’s development experience, and arguing, 
therefore, that  a paradigm shift to ‘soft economics’ (or human development) is necessary to 
understand and confront the continent’s poverty tragedy (Kuada, 2015).   
 Conflicting views exist on the effect of military spending on terrorism, notably 
because some consensus has been established in the literature on the counter-effects of 
military expenditure on terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010, p.195). This consensus argues 
that counterterrorism policies provide more fuel to terrorist attacks, instead of mitigating and 
preventing them (Sandler, 2005). Moreover, such counterterrorism policies are ineffective, in 
part, due to the absence of internationally recognised, comprehensive and long-run policies in 
the battle against terrorism (Omand, 2005). It is argued, for example, that the United States’ 
policies in the fight against terrorism are not effective because they boost the chances of 
terrorism reoccurring (Lum et al., 2006). Feridum and Shahbaz (2010) have established a uni-
directional causality from terrorism to military expenditure. We believe that the intuition 
underpinning the negative relationship between military expenditure and terrorism is still 
open to debate.  
  Moreover, there are very conflicting positions in the literature on the relationship 
between terrorism and governance (Lee, 2013). There is a branch of studies which argues that 
democratic institutions mitigate resentments towards the management of a country and, 
therefore, reduce the possibility of recruitment by terrorists’ organisations (Windsor, 2003; Li, 
2005).  A second strand argues that democratic institutions are not useful in reducing 
terrorism because the interests of terrorist organisations are not properly enshrined in 
democratic political institutions (Gause, 2005).  In addition, nations with solid political 
institutions may be associated with high levels of non-inclusive development (see Bass, 
2014). A contemporary example that illustrates this perspective is the one relating to 
European-born and educated youths leaving Europe to join ISIL because of social exclusion 
(Foster, 2014). In essence, terrorism can be harboured in nations with strong democratic 
institutions because of a multitude of direct and indirect factors that promote grievances: civil 
liberties, freedom and access to media and freedom of speech in the expressions of 
dissatisfaction and disagreement (see Ross, 1993).  
 The empirical literature on the nexus between poverty, human development and 
terrorism is very conflicting. Some of the varying conclusions include: a negative relationship 
between terrorism and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Li, 2005); no nexus 
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between terrorism and GDP per capita (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003); the absence of 
causality from human development to terrorism (Piazza, 2006); an increased likelihood of 
terrorism in poor nations (Abadie, 2006); a positive relationship between terrorism and GDP 
per capita when the views of victims are considered (Gassenbner & Luechinger, 2011); a 
positive relationship between GDP per capita and transnational terrorism (Blomberg et al., 
2014) and economic discrimination of the minority communities influencing domestic 
terrorism (Piazza, 2011; Singh 2002). With a few exceptions (Piazza, 2011; Li & Schaub, 
2004), there has been very little empirical support for the positive nexus between poverty and 
terrorism.  
 In particular, there is a need to focus on Africa which is not receiving the scholarly 
attention it deserves in spite of increasing terrorism levels on the continent and to contribute 
to the debate on the conflicting roles of military expenditure, inclusive development and 
political governance by assessing their complementarities in the fight against terrorism. 
African-oriented literature in the fight against terrorism has focused essentially on: assessing 
the role of freedoms and poverty on terrorism (Barros et al., 2008); the role of global warming 
(Price & Elu, 2016); investigating the influence of competition between military companies 
on the rate at which conflicts are resolved (Akcinaroglu  & Radziszewski, 2013); examining 
the influence of externalities like geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012) and exploring the 
mission of multilateral institutions by the African Union (Ewi & Aning, 2006). 
This inquiry is particularly relevant for sustainable development in the post-2015 
development agenda because terrorism threats may create an uncertain economic outlook 
owing to increasing ambiguity both from local and foreign actors who have been documented 
to prefer ambiguity-safe economic strategies (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018). Terrorism has 
far-reaching consequences such as infrastructural damages, reduction in savings and 
economic output, higher insurance premiums, trade losses and increasing investment costs 
(Singh, 2001, 2007; Efobi et al., 2015). 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 engages with the theoretical and 
empirical underpinnings, while Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical 
analysis and discussion of results are covered in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes with 
future research directions.  
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2. Theoretical underpinnings and intuition 
2.1 Linkage between inclusive development and terrorism 
 We begin by discussing a few key theoretical formulations on the linkages between 
terrorism and inclusive development.  The relative deprivation theory that is developed by 
Gurr (1970) provides interesting insights into the nexus between political stability and 
inclusive development. Given that ‘relative deprivation’ can be considered when “individuals’ 
expectations of economic or political goods exceed the actual distribution of those goods” 
(Piazza, 2006, p.162), the theory “is grounded in the assumption that people who engage in 
rebellious political behavior are motivated principally by anger resulting from […] relative 
deprivation” (Muller & Weede, 1994, p. 40).  
  When resources are captured by a corrupt elite (a scenario that is more likely in 
autocracies than in democracies), citizens can use violent channels as  means to voice their 
anger, frustration and discontent over the absence of inclusive development. Moreover, when 
confronted with substantial deprivation, the poor and marginalised can use violent 
mechanisms in order to make their voices loud and clear. In addition, there is some consensus 
in the microeconomics literature that the absence of inclusive development represents 
opportunities for terrorist organisations to recruit more skilled human resources (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 2005; Benmelech et al., 2012). Deprivation is linked to inclusive human 
development in the perspective that the former is fuelled by the absence of the latter if 
resources for and fruits of economic development are not equitably distributed across the 
population. Moreover, with deprivation, basic needs such as income, education and health 
services (which are constituents of inclusive human development used in this study) are less 
likely to be equitably distributed across the population.  
 While exclusive development may directly increase terrorism because of deprivation 
and frustration, it could also indirectly increase terrorism because of dilapidating social 
conditions (Asongu et al., 2018). The recent empirical literature highlights that dilapidating 
socio-economic circumstances can increase the use of violence by citizens as a channel of 
voicing their discontent (Freytag et al., 2011; Gries et al., 2011; Caruso & Schneider, 2011). 
 On the politico-economic front, there is a tacit assumption that political influence by 
some social groups in the building and framing of institutions can govern access to and 
distribution of resources among social groups within society (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015).  
Where power has been confiscated by a selected few, they can mobilise considerable 
resources needed for the creation and/or consolidation of politico-economic institutions that 
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protect and promote their vested interests.  Deprived citizens at the lower socio-economic 
echelon are likely to respond by employing violent means towards changing the existing 
institutional order or status quo. The use of violent channels in the demand for better politico-
economic participation has been documented in an abundant supply of literature 
(Basuchoudhary &  Shughart, 2010; Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011).  
In spite of many shared theoretical underpinnings, very inconclusive empirical evidence still 
exists on the relationship between terrorism and inclusive development. There is still no 
consensus on the nexus between civil wars and inequality “Over the past few years, prominent 
large-N studies of civil war seem to have reached a consensus that inequality does not 
increase the risk of civil war” (Østby, 2008, p. 143). Yet, another stream of studies argues that 
violence and civil wars are more apparent in societies that are characterised by high levels of 
inequality (Cederman et al., 2011; Baten & Mumme, 2013; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015).  
 The empirical literature on the relationship between inequality and terrorism is also very 
conflicting. One strand of literature maintains that there is no clear nexus between terrorism 
and inequality (Li, 2005; Piazza, 2006; Abadie, 2006), while another one highlights the 
importance of inequality implicitly by emphasising that terrorism results from non-inclusive 
development (see Piazza, 2011, 2013). As concerns the specific relationships between types 
of terrorism and inequality, while domestic terrorism is, for the most part, shown to be the 
result of economic grievances (Piazza, 2013, Singh 2001, 2007), transnational terrorism is 
greased essentially by grievances which are related to the foreign policy of wealthy 
democracies (Savun & Phillips, 2009).  
 It is also important to clarify that transnational terrorism can also be motivated by 
exclusive development when the feeling of exclusive development in one part of the world 
could motivate citizens to engage in terrorist activities in other parts of the world, where 
citizens identifying with them are experiencing similar frustrations. Moreover, the tendency is 
even more likely if aggrieved and poor citizens in various parts of the world subscribe to the 
position that growing inequality among the rich and poor in the world is the results of 
common global policies that governments of their countries have been constrained to adopt by 
the dictates of Western countries and powerful multinational companies (Asongu & Biekpe, 
2018).  
 In the light of the above, this study assumes an underlying sense of solidarity among 
terrorists, such that terrorists in one part of the world may be directly sympathetic to the 
worries of elements of their social beliefs and religion in other parts of the world. The 
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assumption partly explains why individuals of Muslim decent across the world often take to 
the streets in their respective countries to voice their grievances when other Muslims are 
humiliated because of their religion and/or the prophet Mohammed is represented in cartoons. 
This also explains why educated terrorists from comfortable income backgrounds who feel 
excluded, may leave a country where they were born  (say France) to  travel and fight in 
another country (like Syria). 
 
2. 2 Linkage between political governance/stability and terrorism 
 Theoretical linkages on the relationship between terrorism and political governance 
can be discussed in three main strands, notably: the nexus between political governance and 
domestic terrorism; the relationship between transnational terrorism and political governance 
and debates surrounding the linkages between political governance and terrorism (Asongu et 
al. 2018).  
The theoretical background on the association between domestic terrorism and political 
governance builds on the view that citizens within a state are motivated for numerous reasons 
to employ radical mechanisms and political violence in order to question that status quo or 
existing political order (Choi, 2010). Such political violence may be directed at other 
nationals, political figures and/or prevailing institutions. The principal scenarios that motivate 
the use of such violent mechanisms are: (i) grievances on the part of citizens; (ii) growing 
hopelessness and desperation in the absence of peaceful mechanisms by which burning 
grievances can be quelled and (iii) the thought that using terrorism is a justifiable, legitimate 
and viable means of making grievances, anger and frustrations heard. Buttressing this 
foundation is the intuition that, so long as citizens have peaceful mechanisms through which 
conflicts can be settled, terror options are less likely to be exploited for the purpose of making 
their voices heard. Hence, we expect nations with good political governance to be linked with 
less domestic terrorism because these nations offer citizens peaceful channels with which to 
present their grievances.  
 The nexus between transnational terrorism and political governance is grounded on the 
view that political institutions solidify the legitimacy of political systems, which provide 
enabling conditions for the protection of both domestic and foreign citizens (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017). Furthermore, countries with comparatively better standards of political 
governance provide more nonviolent mechanisms with which to resolve conflicts (Choi, 
2010). Therefore, as argued by Asongu et al. (2018), the likelihood for transnational terrorism 
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is reduced when political institutions are available and are seen as legitimate. Strong political 
governance should be linked to less transnational terrorism because through political 
governance (or via the fair and free democratic means of electing and replacing political 
leaders), more avenues are provided for the settlement of scores related to foreign citizens and 
foreign policy.  
The connection between political governance and terrorism is still open to debate because 
conflicting perspectives have been documented in the literature. One school of thought 
articulates optimism about reducing terrorism through certain modes of political governance 
by reliance on the political access theory (Eyerman, 1998). This postulates that relative to 
countries with weak political governance, countries that enjoy strong political governance are 
less associated with terrorism. In essence, countries with better political governance are 
associated with some features that increase immunity to terrorism, notably:  judicial 
independence (Findley & Young, 2011) and respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010). In 
summary, institutions of democracy associated with political governance endow citizens with 
mechanisms by which grievances can be voiced and settled non-violently (Li, 2005).   
 Conversely, irrespective of the differences in the quality of governance between 
nations, the mere regime-based differences within and between countries can still be exploited 
for violent opportunities (Hoffman et al., 2013). While it is thought that autocracies are, in 
general, characterised by poorer quality of  political governance; strong autocracies are, 
seemingly paradoxically, associated with comparatively more political stability. It is 
important to articulate the stable character of democracies because failed or failing states 
encounter more difficulties in controlling terrorism. This view is shared by a substantial bulk 
of literature on the relationship between institutions and terrorism (Schmid, 1992; Eubank & 
Weinberg, 1994; Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Lai, 2007; Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2008a). Hence, in 
some scenarios, strong autocracies may fight terrorism better than democracies because 
democracies endow citizens with avenues of manifesting their grievances, which can be 
abused through violent protests and terrorism. It may be argued that autocratic crushing of 
terrorism may turn out to be a short-lived victory and, perhaps, sows the seeds for more 
discontentment in the long run. 
 There are two  views  on the impact of political institutions on terrorism (Li, 2005). 
The first view maintains that terrorism can be favoured by constraints in government 
procedures and structures as well as deadlocks in checks and balances. According to the 
second view, participative democracy reduces the likelihood for transnational terrorism 
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(Asongu et al., 2018).  From an empirical perspective, there is a bulk of literature also 
maintaining a positive relationship between terrorism and political governance (Eubank & 
Weinberg, 1994; Weinberg & Eubank, 1998; Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Lee, 2013; Piazza, 
2007, 2008b). Therefore, even in competitive environments with strong democratic 
institutions and political governance, terrorism is likely to flourish (Chenoweth, 2010).  
 
2.3 Linkage between military expenditure and terrorism  
 From intuition, terrorism is likely to increase military expenditure because more 
spending for defensive purposes can be a response to increasing levels of terrorism. Hence, in 
a case where military expenditure is the explained variable, a positive relationship is expected 
between terrorism and military expenditure. Moreover, it is expected that, increasing military 
spending should mitigate terrorism. This is essentially because the need to fight terrorism is 
often used to justify the importance of increasing military expenditure.  Hence, the 
relationship between spending in defence and terrorism should be negative when terrorism is 
the variable to be explained.  
  
2.4 Intuition and theoretical insights for complementary effects  
 While Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 have focused on theoretical underpinnings, this section 
builds on the established theoretical insights to substantiate the intuition for complementary 
effects in the suggested policy variables. Accordingly, the intuition for combining the 
established policy variables builds on the fact that the policy variables have been individually 
documented as policy instruments by which terrorism can be mitigated. It is also important to 
note that only individual measures are discussed in the first-three sections because combined 
effects have not been explored in the literature. Our contribution of combining the underlying 
measures is therefore not based on evidence from the extant literature. This is essentially 
because the paper is an applied econometrics study which is motivated by both theory and 
intuition. While the theoretical underpinnings are used to justify the individual effects, the 
combined effects are motivated by intuition for the “applied econometrics”.  
The intuition for combining the policy channels through interactive regressions is that, 
in the real world, governments do not apply different policies aimed at fighting terrorism in 
isolation or independently. Hence, the analysis is simply based on the intuition that in order to 
fight terrorism, a government is very likely to combine policy measures. For instance: take 
measures to improve inclusive development while  simultaneously also adopting  measures 
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that favour political stability; devise policies that are aimed at ensuring political stability with 
a combination of military measures and combine military policies with measures designed to 
improve inclusive  human development. 
 In the light of the above, we argue in the study that “applied econometrics”, which can 
be a combination of theory and intuition, is not exclusively based on the acceptance and 
rejection of existing theories. Accordingly, an empirical exercise based on sound intuition is a 
useful scientific activity and could also lead to theory-building. The arguments on the 
usefulness of applied econometrics are motivated by both intuition and extant theories and are 
consistent with recent economic development (Narayan et al., 2011) and terrorism (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2018) studies.   
 The complementarity between military expenditure, political stability and inclusive 
development can also be seen in the light of theories of economic opportunities, social 
cleavages and hard targets recently employed by Choi (2015). First, from the theory of 
economic opportunities, the presence of inclusive development can boost political stability 
and reduce the need to engage in terrorist violence (Freytag et al., 2011). Political stability is 
also closely related to military expenditure because political instability that is associated with 
terrorism naturally increases military expenditure needed to prevent and fight the 
corresponding terrorism. Second, the theory of social cleavages puts emphasis on the fact that 
historically, societies are partitioned in ethnic groups, religion, class, vocation, economic 
wealth, inter alia (Berelson et al., 1954). These cleavages can be associated with non-inclusive 
development which is associated with political instability, military expenditure and terrorism, 
as explained within the framework of the theory of economic opportunities above. Third, 
according to theory of hard targets:  “as states become richer and better able to defend 
targets, suicide attacks are used more often” (Berman & Laitin, 2008, p.1944). The 
underlying ability to defend targets is logically associated with increasing military 
expenditure and political stability, as well as inclusive development in terms of a higher 
capacity of governments to formulate and implement appropriate policies for the delivery of 
public commodities.  
 The above theoretical perspectives are consistent with Choi and Luo (2013) who have 
maintained that low living standards and exclusive development are associated with more 
political instability and terrorism, which necessitates government action, including a military 
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intervention3. In the light of these theoretical underpinnings, inclusive development, military 
expenditure and political stability can independently and complementarily affect terrorism.  
Buildings on the above intuition and theoretical insights, three hypotheses are tested in 
this study.  
Hypothesis 1: Inclusive development and military expenditure are complementary in reducing 
terrorism. 
Hypothesis 2: Inclusive development and political stability are complementary in fighting 
terrorism. 
Hypothesis 3:  Military expenditure and political stability are complementary in the battle 
against terrorism.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study assesses a panel of 53 African countries with data for the period 1998-2012 
from three main sources: African Development Indicators and World Governance Indicators 
of the World Bank; the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and updated terrorism indicators 
from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012). It is important to note that the 
transformed indicators by Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) use the GTD as a 
primary source of data.  
The choice of the periodicity is motivated by data availability constraints as follows. The 
transformation of terrorism data from the GTD into domestic, transnational, unclear and total 
terrorism dynamics is only available until 2012. Macroeconomic indicators from the World 
Bank are not available before the year 2012. We use World Governance Indicators with 1998 
as the starting year because of the need to have a balanced dataset of non-overlapping 
intervals or data averages.  
In essence, we have five three- year non-overlapping intervals (NOI):  1998-2000; 2001-2003; 
2004-2006; 2007-2009 and 2010-2012. We employ NOI for two main reasons: i) it restricts 
over-identification or limits the proliferation of instruments that could substantially bias 
estimated coefficients, and ii) it mitigates business cycle or short-term disturbances that may 
loom substantially (Islam, 1995, p. 323). A preliminary analysis shows that using annual data 
points instead of data averages substantially bias the estimated coefficients.  
                                                          
3
 The term “associated” should be understood as a linkage. This is essentially because, low living standards and 
exclusive development used in the context represent policy syndromes and not policy variables. When policy 
variables are employed simultaneously, they can reflect complementary or substitution effects.   
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Terrorism is defined in this study as both the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Terrorism is measured in terms of the number of terrorist incidents 
registered by a given country yearly. We study distinct but related terrorism variables to 
capture: domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism. In order to reduce problems 
associated with log transformation of zeros and positive skewness, the data is transformed by 
adding one to the base and then taking the natural logarithms of the number of terrorist 
incidents. This transformation procedure is consistent with other studies such as Choi and 
Salehyan (2013) and Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014).  
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism 
“includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve the nationals of the venue country: 
implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue 
country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concern at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”.  Unclear terrorism is 
that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor 
transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and 
unclear terrorisms.  
The main independent variables used are: political stability; military expenditure and 
inclusive development. In the light of our testable hypotheses, these indicators should 
negatively affect terrorism. Political stability is obtained from the World Bank Governance 
indicators. Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional and 
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. The use of military expenditure to 
proxy for defence spending is consistent with Feridum and Shahbaz (2010).  In accordance 
with Asongu et al. (2015), inclusive development is measured with the inequality adjusted 
human development index (IHDI). The IHDI is the national average of achievements in three 
main domains, namely: (i) decent standards of living (measured with Gross National Income 
per capita, USD Purchasing Power Parity); (ii) health and long life (measured with life 
expectancy at birth) and (iii) education (measured with the mean years of schooling and 
expected years of schooling). Apart from accounting for average gains in health, education 
and wealth, the IHDI also accounts for the distribution of the achievements among the 
population by controlling for mean values of each domain with respect to inequality. The 
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indicator is related to the deprivation theory in the perspective that inequality in the 
distribution of education, income and health, can fuel grievances among the neglected faction 
of the population which might push elements of this aggrieved faction to resort to terrorism as 
a means of making their voices heard. This narrative is in accordance with the position that 
economic hardship experienced by the poor increases their frustrations and makes them more 
vulnerable to resort to terrorism (Choi & Luo, 2013).    
 The control variables adopted control for omitted variables’ bias are: the lagged 
dependent variables, internet penetration, inflation, economic growth and one policy variable. 
We use at least one policy variable as a control variable, when testing each of the hypotheses. 
This is because it enables the study to verify if the expected negative signs underpinning the 
testable hypotheses are statistically fragile.  Moreover, given that the study is assessing 
complementarities with three policy variables, only two policy variables can be employed 
when testing each hypothesis. Therefore, the third policy variable is used as a control variable 
to further account for omitted variable bias. Preliminary assessment showed that controlling 
for more than five factors leads to instrument proliferation and invalidity of estimated 
coefficients.  
 We now discuss the expected signs of the variables, including the policy indicators 
which also double as control variables4. First, on inclusive development, there is an evolving 
body of literature maintaining that sympathy for and adherence to terrorists’ organisations is 
due to non-inclusive development (Bass, 2014). The thesis has been substantiated by Foster 
(2014) who has documented the feeling of socio-economic exclusion as a main driver behind 
the sympathy for ISIL by Western-born and educated youths. In Nigeria, a reason for the 
burgeoning Boko Haram is because compared to the Southern region; the North has been 
lagging behind in terms of development. This is consistent with the literature on the role of 
inequality in political instability in the country (Langer et al., 2009). Second, there is an 
abundant supply of literature on the relevance of military expenditure in fighting terrorism 
(Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridum & Shahbaz, 2010). Third, the interest of political 
stability is twofold: intuitive and theoretical. From intuition, political stability provides a non-
violent environment that is less conducive for terrorists’ activities. Political access theory 
posits that politically stable countries are less associated with terrorism (Eyerman, 1998). 
Fourth, according to Holbrook (2015) and Argomaniz (2015), internet is an important 
                                                          
4
 The purpose of using a third policy instrument as a control variable each time a combination (of policy 
variables) is employed is to make the estimated models comparable. Hence, the fact that each of a policy 
variables is also a control variable motivates a brief discussion on their expected signs in the data section. 
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recruitment and coordinating instrument for terrorists’ organisation. Fifth, chaotic inflation is 
very likely to fuel political strife and socio-economic unrest (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016) 
which, in turn, could provide a fertile ground for the development of terrorism. Sixth, there is 
some consensus in the empirical literature that economic prosperity reduces possibilities for 
terrorism because economic prosperity is consistent with more opportunities for social 
mobility and employment and  more government financial resources needed to prevent and 
fight terrorism. These positions are in accordance with Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) who 
have established that compared to high-income countries, low-income nations have limited 
financial resources with which to attenuate the negative externalities associated with 
terrorism. It is relevant to balance this narrative with recent evidence that: “economic growth 
is not a cure-all solution for terrorism because it may be associated in some instances with 
more terrorist incidents” (Choi, 2015, p. 157). 
 The definitions of variables with corresponding sources, summary statistics and 
correlation matrix are disclosed in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively. 
Appendix 2 shows that the mean values of variables are comparable and  based on the 
corresponding standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages 
would emerge. High standard deviations among variables of interest imply that it is very 
likely that there are significant associations between them. The correlation matrix enables the 
study to avoid issues of multicollinearity that could produce unexpected estimated signs.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Estimation specification  
 The consideration of whether policy variables are complements or substitutes is based 
on interactive regressions. While this interactive approach is reasonable, it is also supported 
by the extant literature (Osabuohien & Efobi, 2013; Asongu et al., 2017). It is relevant to 
substantiate the terms of complementarity and substitutability  which are not common in the 
terrorism literature. Within the context of this study, two policies are complementary when, if 
implemented simultaneously, they enhance the qualities or expected signs of each other. 
Conversely, two policies are substitutes when, if implemented simultaneously, they reduce the 
qualities or expected signs of each other. Hence, an estimated interactive term is expected to 
display a positive sign when two variables are complementary and a negative sign when the 
same variables are substitutes. As clarified by Brambor et al. (2016) and recent empirical 
literature (Tchamyou, 2019), in interactive regressions, the overall influence of the 
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modulating variable should be based on net effects (i.e. a combination of implied marginal 
effects and unconditional effects). Hence, in this study the conclusions on complementary and 
substitution effects are based on net effects.  
Previous studies that have looked at terrorism have employed Ordinary Least Squares 
(Tavares, 2004; Bravo & Dias, 2006); Zero-inflated Negative and Negative Binomial 
regressions (Drakos & Gofas, 2006; Savun & Phillips, 2009); the multilevel Poisson model 
(Lee, 2013); logistic regressions (Bhavani, 2011; Kavanagh, 2011) and Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014).  
In this study, we adopt the GMM approach for four main reasons. First, the N (53)>T(5) basic 
criterion for the employment of GMM is met because the number of countries (N) is higher 
than the number of years per country (T). Second, the estimation approach controls for 
endogeneity in all regressors. Third, cross-country differences are not eliminated in the 
estimation strategy. Fourth, small-sample oriented biases that are characteristic of the 
difference estimator are accounted-for in the system GMM strategy.  
 Hence, forward orthogonal deviations are employed instead of first differences 
because the former approach restricts over-identification, limits the proliferation of 
instruments and accounts for cross-sectional dependence (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008; Tchamyou, 2019, 2020). Instead of a one-step approach, a two-step strategy is 
adopted. Accordingly, the two-step (resp. one-step) approach is consistent with 
heteroscedasticity (resp. homoscedasticity).  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, tiT ,
 
is a terrorism indicator (domestic, transnational, unclear or total terrorism) of 
country i
 
at  period t ; tiF , , is the first policy variable (which could be inclusive development, 
military expenditure or political stability); tiS , , is a second policy variable (which could also 
be inclusive development, military expenditure or political stability);
 
tiFS , , is one of the three 
possible combinations of the interaction between the first and second policy variables (which 
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could be either between inclusive development and military expenditure, political stability 
and military expenditure or political stability and inclusive development); 0
 
is a constant;
 

represents the order to auto-regression; W is the vector of control variables (internet 
penetration, GDP growth, inflation and policy variable) ;
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect; t
 
is the time-specific constant and ti ,  is the error term. 
 
3.2.2 Identification in exclusion restrictions  
 Following Dewan and Ramaprasad (2014), Asongu and De Moor (2017) and 
Tchamyou et al. (2019a, 2019b), all independent variables are predetermined variables or 
suspected endogenous. Therefore the gmmstyle is used for these indicators and only years are 
considered and treated as exogenous. The strategy for treating the ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, 
eq(diff))’ because it is not likely for years to become endogenous in first-difference (see 
Roodman, 2009b; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Boateng et al., 2018)5. 
 In order to tackle issues of simultaneity, lagged regressors are used as instruments for 
forward-differenced variables. In essence, Helmet transformations are performed in order to 
eliminate fixed effects that are likely to influence the investigated relationships. This 
technique which is in accordance with Love and Zicchino (2006) consists of deriving forward 
mean-differences of variables. Hence, the mean of all future observations are subtracted from 
the variables instead of deducting the previous observation from the contemporaneous one 
(see Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). The transformations enable parallel or orthogonal conditions 
between forward-differenced values and lagged observations. Regardless of the number of 
lags, in order to mitigate the loss of data, with the exception of the last observation for each 
cross-section, the transformations are computed for all observed values. Since lagged 
observations do not enter the formula, they can be interpreted as instruments (Roodman, 
2009b). 
 In the light of the above clarifications, among instrumental variables, only years are 
considered strictly exogenous. Hence, they (years) affect terrorism exclusively via the 
endogenous explaining or predetermined or suspected endogenous variables. The statistical 
relevance of the exclusion restriction is examined with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) 
for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the alternative hypothesis of the test should be 
                                                          
5
 Gmmstyle is the Stata command used to define endogenous explaining variables whereas ivstyle is a Stata 
command for defining strictly exogenous variables.  
18 
 
rejected for the instruments to elicit terrorism exclusively through the predetermined 
variables. While in a standard instrumental variable (IV) technique failure to reject the null 
hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test implies that the instruments 
do not elicit the outcome variable beyond the predetermined variables (see Beck et al., 2003), 
in the GMM strategy with forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion for 
exclusion restriction is the DHT. Therefore, the exclusion restriction is confirmed if the null 
hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
 It is important to articulate two concerns that could potentially bias the estimated 
findings. First, terrorist acts are usually part of a sustained campaign that may involve many 
years. Such linkage is acknowledged because years are considered in the specifications since 
the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time effects is taken into account. Moreover, it is 
important to note that, country-specific effects are theoretically not consistent with the GMM 
approach because they are eliminated by first-differencing, in order to avoid endogeneity from 
the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and country-specific effects. Second, it 
reasonable to acknowledge that terrorism also causes the independent variables of interest (i.e. 
military expenditure, political stability and inclusive development). This is essentially because 
it can, inter alia, weaken the ability of governments to carry out wide reforms. The concern 
about simultaneity or reverse causality is addressed by the instrumentation process or through 
Helmet transformation as discussed above.   
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 display the results corresponding to complementarities between ‘inclusive 
development and military expenditure’, ‘inclusive development and political stability’ and 
‘military expenditure and political stability’ respectively. Four principal information criteria 
were used to examine the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations6.  
                                                          
6
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second, the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test 
is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order 
to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower 
than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a 
Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200) 
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 The findings are engaged in terms of marginal effects and net impacts. Net effects are 
computed with: (i) the unconditional effect from a policy variable and (ii) the conditional 
effect that is based on the interaction between two policy variables. For example in the last 
column of Table 1, the net impact of inclusive development with military expenditure is 0.265 
([0.809×0.872] + [-0.440])7, while the net effect of military expenditure with inclusive human 
development is 0.580 ([0.809×2.245] + -1.236)8. Military expenditure complements inclusive 
development in the former, whereas inclusive development complements military expenditure 
in the latter.  
We begin by assessing if the intuition underpinning the testable hypotheses is sound. 
In other words, we want to examine whether the underlying logic for a negative relationship 
between the policy variables and terrorism is statistically fragile or not. This assessment is 
possible by examining the signs of the policy variables used as control variables in each table. 
The signs of estimated coefficients corresponding to political stability, military expenditure 
and inclusive development are consistently negative in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 
respectively. The implication of these negative effects is that the basis for anticipating a 
negative nexus between each policy variable and terrorism is sound.  
Table 1 displays the results on the complementarities between inclusive development 
and military expenditure. Analysing the data, we find that while the unconditional effects 
from inclusive development and military expenditure are consistently negative, the 
conditional effects from interactions are consistently positive. In addition, the corresponding 
net effects from complementarities are consistently positive. Given that the unconditional 
impacts are negative, it follows from the net effects that military expenditure and inclusive 
development are substitutes, not complements in the fight against terrorism. We note that the 
significant control variables have expected signs for the most part. The unexpected negative 
effect of inflation can be traceable to a low median inflation. Accordingly, whereas the mean 
value of inflation is 10.012, the corresponding median value of 5.108 can be qualified as low. 
“Please insert Table 1 here” 
Table 2 displays the results on the complementarities between ‘inclusive development 
and political stability’. We find that net effects for inclusive development with political 
stability are negative whereas the net impacts for political stability with inclusive 
development are positive. It follows that in the fight against terrorism, it is more relevant to 
                                                          
7
 0.872 is the mean value of inclusive development in Appendix 2.  
8
 2.245 is the mean value of military expenditure in Appendix 2.  
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use political stability as a complement of inclusive development than to use inclusive 
development as a complement of political stability. This is logical because the unconditional 
effect of inclusive development (political stability) is more negative (positive). Most of the 
control variables are significant with the expected signs.  
 
“Please insert Table 2 here” 
 
Table 3 provides the results on the complementarities between ‘military expenditure 
and political stability’. It is interesting to note that with the exception of transnational 
terrorism for which net effects are not apparent and the net effect of political stability with 
military expenditure which is positive, it can be broadly established that military expenditure 
and political stability are complementary in the fight against terrorism. We find the significant 
control variables display expected signs.  
 
“Please insert Table 3 here” 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications  
In the light of the findings, we restrospect to the tested hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Inclusive development and military expenditure are complementary in reducing 
terrorism (False). 
Hypothesis 2: Inclusive development and political stability are complementary in fighting 
terrorism (This could either be true or false depending on sequencing).  
Hypothesis 3:  Military expenditure and political stability are complementary in the battle 
against terrorism (Broadly True).  
 The role of policy has either been to use military expenditure, inclusive development 
or political stability as instruments in the fight against terrorism. Policy-makers who have 
been viewing their objective as simply increasing instruments in order to combat terrorism 
need to have a complete picture of how these policy instruments interact with one another to 
influence the outcome variable. This requires some understanding of sequencing, 
complementarity and substitutionality of the policy tools.  
 In terms of sequencing, we have established that in the fight against terrorism, it is 
more relevant to use political stability as a complement of inclusive development, than to use 
inclusive development as a complement of political stability. As a policy implication, in 
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complementary policy efforts, political stability should be prioritised over inclusive 
development in the battle against terrorism. This finding is broadly consistent with Krueger 
and Laitin (2008) who have concluded that, compared to economic development; political 
repression fuels terrorism. It is also worthwhile to clarify that political repression is not 
necessarily the opposite of stability. This is essentially because preemptive repression may 
deter instability, while reactive repression is normally a response to instability. 
 With regards to complementarity, we have broadly established that military 
expenditure and political stability are complementary in the fight against terrorism. As a 
policy implication, pursuing policies of military intervention and political stability 
simultaneously is very likely to negatively affect terrorism.  
 On the substitutability front, we have shown that military expenditure and inclusive 
development are substitutes, not complements in the fight against terrorism. As a policy 
implication, pursuing the two policies simultaneously would not be effective in battling 
terrorism. In the light of the evidence on sequencing, complementarity and substitutability, 
when the three policy variables are viewed within the same framework, it is most feasible to 
first pursue the objective of political stability and then complement it with military 
expenditure and inclusive development.  
Previous studies have considered policy variables independently. Unfortunately, in the 
real world, instruments for fighting terrorism interact with another to influence the outcome 
variables. Our findings are fundamentally inconsistent with the studies that have assessed the 
policy tools from unilateral perspectives. Military expenditure has been documented to be 
insufficent in fighting terrorism because it further fuels terrorism for the most part (see  
Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). Our findings improve the 
insights into the strand of the literature on the need to complement military expenditure with 
other policy variables in order to achieve the desired outcome.  
The complementary role of inclusive human development in decreasing terrorism, 
challenges existing studies which have established: (i) no relationship between economic 
development and terrorism (and/or civil wars) (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Piazza, 2006;   
Østby, 2008, p. 143); (ii) a positive nexus between economic development and terrorism 
(Gassenbner & Luechinger, 2011; Blomberg et al., 2014) and (iii) the absence of a  
relationship between inclusive development and terrorism (Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; 
Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2006).  
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 With regard to political stability, the findings of the study align with the strand of 
literature which documents the instrumental role of good political governance in the 
mitigation of negative sentiments that terrorist organisations exploit in their recruitments and 
activities (Windsor, 2003; Li, 2005).    
 
5. Conclusion, caveats and further research directions 
This study has examined complementarities between inclusive development, military 
expenditure and political stability in the fight against terrorism in 53 African countries for the 
period 1998-2012. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations.  
The following main findings are established. Firstly, military expenditure and inclusive 
development are substitutes, not complements. Secondly, it is more relevant to use political 
stability as a complement of inclusive development than to use inclusive development as a 
complement of political stability. Finally, it can be broadly established that military 
expenditure and political stability are complementary.  
In the light of the sequencing, complementarity and substitutability, when the three 
policy variables are viewed within the same framework, it is more feasible to first pursue 
political stability and then complement it with military expenditure and inclusive 
development.  
The main caveat of the study is that it does not theoretically and empirically take into 
account the fact that violence, as a reaction to grievances associated with development, could 
be expressed through terrorism, but could also be expressed through rebel activity which 
would not be coded as terrorism. Hence, terrorism and civil war are closely associated. Civil 
war is not involved in the conditioning information set partly because of data availability 
constraints and partly because the policy channel of political stability is also employed as a 
control variable.  
Another caveat is the comparatively less actionable nature of political stability. 
Accordingly, among the policy variables used in the study, some measures may be easier to 
influence than others. For instance, while components of the inclusive human development 
index (i.e. health, income and education) and military expenditure are under the control of a 
government, political stability is more difficult to influence. However, through pro-active   
mechanisms, governments can ensure political stability by distinct policies, inter alia: 
repression and consensus-building.  
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Future studies can assess if the established relationships in this paper withstand further 
empirical scrutiny by employing alternative methodologies that articulate country fixed-
effects which are eliminated in the system GMM technique by design. 
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Table 1: Complementarity between inclusive development and military expenditure  
         
 
Dependent variable: terrorism 
 
Domestic Terror Transnational Terror Unclear Terror Total Terror 
     
Constant  0.460 0.467* 0.412** 0.813*** 0.122 0.343*** 0.358 0.759** 
 (0.160) (0.080) (0.012) (0.000) (0.268) (0.000) (0.287) (0.036) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.681*** 0.798*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
Trans. Terror(-1) --- --- 0.122 0.103* --- --- --- --- 
   (0.468) (0.069)     
Unclear Terror (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.217 0.700*** --- --- 
     (0.396) (0.000)   
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.379** 0.651*** 
       (0.014) (0.000) 
Inclusive development (ID) -0.598 -0.682 -1.138*** -1.388*** -0.294 -0.511*** -0.571 -1.236** 
 (0.378) (0.159) (0.002) (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.413) (0.046) 
Military Expenditure (ME) -0.243 -0.291* -0.249** -0.455*** -0.063 -0.172*** -0.122 -0.440** 
 (0.267) (0.050) (0.019) (0.000) (0.364) (0.000) (0.576) (0.029) 
ID×ME  0.385 0.437 0.760*** 0.925*** 0.196 0.341*** 0.373 0.809* 
 (0.396) (0.176) (0.002) (0.000) (0.176) (0.000) (0.424) (0.053) 
Internet  --- 0.012*** --- 0.005** --- 0.001 --- 0.015*** 
  (0.000)  (0.048)  (0.172)  (0.000) 
GDP growth  --- -0.020** --- -0.028*** --- -0.010*** --- -0.034** 
  (0.018)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.022) 
Inflation --- -0.004*** --- -0.002*** --- -0.002*** --- -0.004*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Political Stability   --- -0.004*** --- -0.392*** --- -0.046*** --- -0.498*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Net effect  of  ID with ME Na na 0.413 0.351 na 0.125 Na 0.265 
Net effect of  ME with ID Na na 0.568 0.688 na 0.254 Na 0.580 
         
AR(1) (0.050) (0.015) (0.041) (0.022) (0.499) (0.046) (0.063) (0.006) 
AR(2) (0.875) (0.654) (0.644) (0.933) (0.350) (0.288) (0.525) (0.357) 
Sargan OIR (0.099) (0.057) (0.002) (0.005) (0.022) (0.176) (0.003) (0.012) 
Hansen OIR (0.326) (0.295) (0.498) (0.538) (0.909) (0.396) (0.544) (0.316) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.127) (0.223) (0.214) (0.317) (0.333) (0.375) (0.207) (0.094) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.574) (0.408) (0.675) (0.637) (0.988) (0.412) (0.743) (0.648) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.253) (0.175) (0.417) (0.395) (0.744) (0.347) (0.316) (0.217) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.491) (0.924) (0.523) (0.867) (0.937) (0.516) (0.878) (0.766) 
         
Fisher  95.32*** 1221.03*** 6.26*** 280.84*** 6.82*** 90.54*** 41.45*** 1333.08*** 
Instruments  18 34 18 34 18 34 18 34 
Countries  49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
Observations  170 167 170 167 170 167 170 167 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable because at least of the constituents in the computation of net effects is not 
significant.  
Source: Authors’ computation.   
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Table 2: Complementarity between inclusive development and political stability   
         
 Dependent variable: terrorism  
 Domestic Terror Transnational Terror Unclear Terror Total Terror 
     
Constant  0.395* 0.403*** 0.361*** 0.244*** 0.051 0.114*** 0.578*** 0.491*** 
 (0.054) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.241) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.791*** 0.760*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
Trans. Terror(-1) --- --- 0.079 0.162** --- --- --- --- 
   (0.643) (0.020)     
Unclear Terror (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.400* 0.593*** --- --- 
     (0.089) (0.000)   
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.438*** 0.515*** 
       (0.001) (0.000) 
Inclusive development (ID) -0.625** -0.277*** -0.653*** -0.008 -0.084 -0.086*** -0.897*** -0.309*** 
 (0.041) (0.000) (0.000) (0.918) (0.300) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Political Stability  (PS) 0.674 -0.092 0.585*** -0.321*** 0.087 0.076*** 0.872** -0.129 
 (0.147) (0.342) (0.005) (0.002) (0.432) (0.001) (0.034) (0.232) 
ID×PS -1.803* -0.751*** -1.955*** -0.007 -0.253 -0.257*** -2.651*** -0.862*** 
 (0.050) (0.001) (0.000) (0.975) (0.303) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Internet  --- 0.015*** --- 0.008*** --- -0.002** --- 0.019*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.034)  (0.000) 
GDPg growth  --- -0.017* --- -0.022*** --- -0.004** --- -0.024*** 
  (0.052)  (0.003)  (0.020)  (0.004) 
Inflation --- -0.002* --- -0.0007 --- -0.001*** --- -0.001 
  (0.050)  (0.232)  (0.000)  (0.278) 
Military Expenditure    --- -0.138*** --- -0.078*** --- -0.016 --- -0.138*** 
  (0.001)  (0.009)  (0.119)  (0.003) 
  
 
 
 
   
 
Net effect of ID with PS Na na -1.119 na na -0.148 -1.439 na 
Net effect of  PS with ID 0.368 0.136 0.424 na na 0.055 0.563 0.165 
         
AR(1) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.032) (0.073) (0.005) (0.009) 
AR(2) (0.854) (0.832) (0.823) (0.908) (0.463) (0.248) (0.728) (0.476) 
Sargan OIR (0.206) (0.064) (0.037) (0.001) (0.003) (0.134) (0.137) (0.028) 
Hansen OIR (0.017) (0.362) (0.217) (0.554) (0.129) (0.751) (0.070) (0.375) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.907) (0.039) (0.051) (0.430) (0.524) (0.287) (0.939) (0.041) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.004) (0.880) (0.619) (0.566) (0.076) (0.894) (0.019) (0.887) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.143) (0.317) (0.080) (0.633) (0.108) (0.818) (0.118) (0.345) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.014) (0.505) (0.932) (0.251) (0.347) (0.280) (0.128) (0.453) 
         
Fisher  50.21*** 633.27*** 19.10*** 240.15*** 3.80*** 95.16*** 40.64*** 309.49*** 
Instruments  18 34 18 34 18 34 18 34 
Countries  52 49 52 49 52 49 52 49 
Observations  183 167 183 167 183 167 183 167 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable because at least of the constituents in the computation of net effects is not 
significant.  
Source: Authors’ computation.   
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Table 3: Complementarity between military expenditure and political stability  
         
 
Dependent variable: terrorism 
 
Domestic Terror Transnational Terror Unclear Terror Total Terror 
     
Constant  0.278*** 0.359*** 0.127* 0.222*** 0.036 0.019 0.472*** 0.522*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.077) (0.004) (0.167) (0.559) (0.000) (0.001) 
Domestic Terror(-1) 0.576*** 0.743*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)       
Trans. Terror(-1) --- --- -0.089 0.162* --- --- --- --- 
   (0.312) (0.066)     
Unclear Terror (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.282 0.648*** --- --- 
     (0.141) (0.000)   
Total Terror(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.331*** 0.617*** 
       (0.008) (0.000) 
Military Expenditure  (ME) -0.084*** -0.179** -0.029 -0.074 -0.003 0.035** -0.143*** -0.185* 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.122) (0.118) (0.724) (0.013) (0.000) (0.082) 
Political Stability  (PS) 0.207 -0.367*** -0.199 -0.379*** 0.009 -0.123*** 0.166 -0.413*** 
 (0.281) (0.000) (0.126) (0.000) (0.841) (0.000) (0.531) (0.000) 
ME×PS -0.136** -0.043 -0.030 -0.008 -0.001 0.044*** -0.235*** -0.081 
 (0.014) (0.246) (0.222) (0.696) (0.926) (0.000) (0.001) (0.124) 
Internet  --- 0.012*** --- 0.010*** --- 0.0009 --- 0.014*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.520)  (0.000) 
GDP growth  --- -0.015 --- -0.026*** --- -0.009*** --- -0.039*** 
  (0.210)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inflation --- -0.005*** --- -0.001** --- -0.002*** --- -0.004*** 
  (0.002)  (0.023)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Inclusive development    --- -0.027*** --- -0.006*** --- -0.0003 --- -0.026*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.249)  (0.000) 
  
 
 
 
   
 
Net effect of ME with PS -0.099 na Na na na -0.024 na Na 
Net effect of PS with ME -0.009 na Na na na 0.010 -0.013 Na 
         
AR(1) (0.070) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.262) (0.048) (0.094) (0.010) 
AR(2) (0.467) (0.478) (0.682) (0.932) (0.308) (0.315) (0.102) (0.154) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.016) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.324) (0.000) (0.007) 
Hansen OIR (0.090) (0.182) (0.281) (0.609) (0.703) (0.783) (0.097) (0.192) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.140) (0.085) (0.135) (0.240) (0.525) (0.386) (0.047) (0.040) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.144) (0.428) (0.483) (0.743) (0.660) (0.867) (0.321) (0.615) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.077) (0.122) (0.242) (0.427) (0.512) (0.763) (0.042) (0.147) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.315) (0.681) (0.406) (0.990) (0.801) (0.515) (0.675) (0.549) 
         
Fisher  3.87*** 863.23*** 1.88* 264.16**** 2.35*** 190.34**** 3.96*** 1031.57*** 
Instruments  18 34 18 34 18 34 18 34 
Countries  50 49 50 49 50 49 50 49 
Observations  187 167 187 167 187 167 187 167 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. na: not applicable because at least of the constituents in the computation of net effects is not 
significant.  
Source: Authors’ computation.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
Domestic terrorism Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  
 
Enders et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
   
Uuclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear (in Ln) 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent means, 
including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inclusive 
development    
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
    
Military Expense    Milit Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Consumer Price Index  (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  UNDP: United Nations Development Program. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Domestic terrorism  0.401 0.805 0.000 4.781 265 
Transnational terrorism 0.203 0.451 0.000 2.802 265 
Unclear terrorism 0.060 0.193 0.000 1.566 265 
Total terrorism 0.500 0.885 0.000 4.895 265 
Political Stability -0.551 0.929 -3.297 1.087 265 
Inclusive development  0.872 4.210 0.161 45.231 220 
Military Expenditure  2.245 2.899 0.151 35.846 231 
Internet penetration  4.766 8.022 0.002 51.174 264 
GDP growth  4.706 4.230 -8.149 32.265 259 
Inflation   10.012 25.435 -6.934 275.983 242 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
Source: Authors’ computation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix 
PS Internet IHDI GDPg Inflation Milit Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.236 0.029 -0.033 -0.238 -0.260 -0.535 -0.530 -0.365 -0.596 PS 
 1.000 0.018 -0.023 -0.062 -0.087 0.079 0.052 0.129 0.063 Internet 
  1.000 -0.078 -0.016 -0.040 0.090 0.052 -0.031 0.080 IHDI 
   1.000 -0.197 -0.052 0.076 0.157 0.060 0.089 GDPg 
    1.000 -0.128 0.0002 0.030 0.061 0.027 Inflation 
     1.000 0.185 0.107 0.040 0.194 Milit 
      1.000 0.661 0.760 0.973 Domter 
       1.000 0.641 0.785 Tranter 
        1.000 0.776 Unclter 
         1.000 Totter 
           
PS: Political Stability/Non violence.. Internet: Internet Penetration. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. GDPg: Gross 
Domestic Product Growth. Milit: Military Expenditure. Domter: Domestic Terrorism. Tranter: Transnational Terrorism. Unclter: Unclear 
Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
Source: Authors’ computation.   
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